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  A residential water demand equation is estimated using a panel data sample of 5 
Portuguese local communities and 72 months, corresponding to a total number of 360 
observations. Because of the presence of multi-part tariffs, we use as explanatory variables the 
two common price-related variables: marginal price and difference. To prevent the 
simultaneity bias from using observed quantities to determine the values of marginal price 
and difference directly from the rate schedule, we use an instrumental variable approach to 
create a constant marginal price and difference parameters for each rate structure. 
The price elasticity value obtained fall within the range of those found in other case 
studies. Thus, although presenting weak elasticity, price seems to play a role in water demand 
management. However, we do not confirm the expected influence of difference on residential 
water demand. This can be a consequence of the complexity of the Portuguese water tariffs 
and the confusing signs that come from the simultaneous use of fixed quotas and increasing 
block tariffs. So, it is imperative to clarify water tariffs objectives by reviewing the 
Portuguese water tariffs design processes. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Recently, it has been widely accepted that the strategy of expanding the supply of 
water to satisfy increased demand is constrained by the scarcity of water resources. So, there 
has been a change of approach to water management, from supply-side policies to demand-
side ones. Some water sector specificities, such us the universal service obligation, together 
with the growing concern to induce consumers to use water more efficiently, claim to 
properly assess the expected effects of pricing policies on water consumption. Estimating 
household demand for water is, therefore, a prerequisite for any water resource policy design, 
due to the importance of domestic consumption in an urban context. Many contributions to 
the analysis of these effects emerge from case studies estimating water demand functions, 
most of them using United States of America (USA) data. 
In the European Union (EU), the Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC) 
recommends the use of tariffs in conjunction with other schemes to promote the rational use 
of water, such as information/education campaigns, and the reduction of leaks in the systems, 
as the instruments to be used by a demand based strategy. However, empirical evidence from 
European countries on the effects of those instruments for managing water is still scarce. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate a Portuguese residential water demand 
equation in order to explain the effects of the pricing policy on water consumption and to 
provide those making water allocation decisions in Portugal with relevant and useful 
information. The residential water demand function is estimated using aggregated data (at the 
municipal level), collected for each billing period in five municipalities in the Centre Region 
of Portugal, with panel data estimating techniques. 
One point of interest of our case study is that it uses data per billing period instead of 
the usual utilization of annual data, which is very rare, especially in European studies. 
Furthermore, another contribution of this empirical application is that we consider sewerage 
rates, when applicable, together with water supply rates. Thus, if there are any cross-subsidy 
effects between water and sanitation, they are taken into account by our price-related 
variables’ computed values. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature on 
the estimation of residential water demand, focusing attention on where multi-parts tariff 
structure applies. In Section 3 some characteristics of Portuguese water supply, water use and 
pricing are presented. Section 4 is dedicated to the dataset description and methodology.   3




  2. Overview of the literature on water demand 
 
Once water was recognised as a scarce good, it became clear that the strategy to adopt 
given the growing demand for water could not continuously rely only on the expansion of 
supply. Therefore, demand side management (DSM) policies have been stimulating 
significant discussion among water utility managers, policymakers, and economists. Since the 
60s, several economists have been discussing the best way to regulate the management of 
water demand, sustaining their ideas with theoretical and empirical studies dealing with the 
estimation of residential water demand. The focus of these studies has been to obtain accurate 
price elasticities of demand. 
Although water demand has been extensively studied, most studies, such as Howe and 
Linaweaver (1967), Gibbs (1978), Danielson (1979), Foster and Beattie (1979), Billings 
(1982), Schefter and David (1985), Chicoine and Ramamurthy (1986), Moncur (1987), 
Niesdwiadomy and Molina (1989), Renwick and Archibald (1998) and Renwick and Green 
(2000), have used data from the USA. However, more recently some studies started to deal 
with the estimation of residential water demand in some European countries. Examples of this 
type of literature are Hansen (1996), Höglund (1999), Nauges and Thomas (2000), Martínez-
Espiñeira (2003), Garcia and Reynaud (2004) and Martínez-Espiñeira (2004). No study on 
water demand in relation to Portugal was found except for Martins and Fortunato (2005). 
Because it is hard to obtain household level data, the great majority of the studies are 
based on annual aggregate data (at community level), converted to be used as typical 
(representative) user level. Despite the consensus found in the literature on the importance of 
seasonal water demand, intra-annual data are rarely used. An exception is the study by 
Martínez-Espiñeira (2003), who standardized consumption data from two, three or four month 
periods, into monthly equivalents. 
There is some agreement in the literature on the variables to be taken into account for 
the residential water demand function. The dependent variable commonly used is the quantity 
of metered water per household. An exception is Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges (2004) who 
used per capita data instead of household data. The explanatory variables found in the 
literature on this subject can be grouped into two types: non-price and price-related variables.   4
The former group includes variables such as the size of the household, climate variables, 
income and other socio-economic variables. 
Although there is agreement on the importance of including water price elements in 
the demand function, the same cannot be said about the specification of the relevant price 
variable. There is a great debate about the appropriate price variable: average price has been 
used (Foster and Beatie, 1979; Chicoine and Ramamurthy, 1986; Point, 1993; Nauges and 
Thomas 2000, among others), as well as marginal price (Howe and Linaweaver, 1967; Gibbs, 
1982; Hansen, 1996; Höglund, 1999, among others), and both price measures simultaneously 
(Gibbs, 1978; Nieswiadomy, 1992). 
Under block pricing structures, the choice of the relevant price measure is even more 
difficult and constitutes one of the most controversial issues encountered in the literature on 
water demand. In some studies, the authors simplified this problem by ignoring the presence 
of block rates and using, for example, the first block price (Danielson, 1979 and Moncur, 
1987). But most models using block tariffs data (Billings and Agthe, 1980; Billings, 1982; 
Schefter and David, 1985; Chicoine and Ramamurthy, 1986; Chicoine et al, 1986; 
Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989; Agthe and Billings, 1996; Renwick and Archibald, 1998, 
Renwick and Green, 2000; Martínez-Espiñeira, 2003; Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges, 2004) 
follow the Taylor (1975) – Nordin (1976) specification, making use of the combination of two 
price related variables, in order to reflect the tariff structure that the consumer faces. 
In his electricity demand study, Taylor (1975) considered that to capture the influence 
of the block rates both the marginal price for the block in which the household is consuming 
and the average price should be included. Based on that idea, Nordin (1976) argued that the 
income effect imposed by the pricing schedule should also be taken into account. An 
appropriate representation of that effect could be pointed up by the difference between the 
actual total water bill and what would be paid by customers if every cubic meter of water was 
purchased at the marginal price. This difference became known as Nordin’s difference 
variable (D). In notational form,  
∑
=
− − − + =
m
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where  
qi   - upper volume of consumption in the i block; 
pi - price of the consumption in the i
th block; 
pm – marginal price, the price of the consumption in the m
th block, the last block;   5
The coefficient of the difference variable should have a negative sign, representing an 
implicit subsidy or implicit tax that comes from the tariff structure, depending on if there is an 
increasing or decreasing block structure, respectively. According to Nordin (1976) in linear 
models this coefficient should be symmetrical but equal in magnitude to the coefficient of 
income
1. 
In addition to the choice of the relevant explanatory price variable, the presence of 
block rates generates other problems, such as that of simultaneity. In fact, under block pricing 
schemes it is expected that the marginal water price (p) influences the volume of consumption 
(q) but p is also determined by the level of consumption, as illustrated by the example in 
figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 –Specific hypothetical rate schedule with increasing three block rates 
 
In order to solve the simultaneity problem two types of solutions have been tested. 
One consists of using instrumental variables estimation techniques, such as two-stage least 
squares or three-stage least squares, instead of ordinary least squares, as did Niesdwiadomy 
and Molina (1989) and Renwick and Green (2000), among others. The other type of solution, 
first applied by Billings (1982) to the water sector and recently used, for example, by Agthe 
and Billings (1996), Martínez-Espiñeira (2003), and Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges (2004), 
consists of creating a linear approximation to the total water bill and then deriving from it a 
constant marginal price and a constant difference parameter for each rate structure, to surpass 
the simultaneity between price and consume. For this, first a customer’s water bill (BILL) 
                                                 
1 Although this variable has been included in the specification of several residential water demand models, the 
magnitude of its effect has not been empirically confirmed. 
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function is computed for each rate structure, over the range of integer quantities (q) found in 
the data: 
µ β α + + = q BILL           ( 2 )  
Then, the values of BILL are regressed against corresponding q values to obtain the estimated 
linear  BILL function. Its slope,  q
BILL
∂
∂ = β ˆ , corresponds to the estimated instrumental 
marginal price variable (IVP) and α ˆ  is the estimated intercept of the regression equation. 
Thus, α ˆ  represents the total estimated bill when the quantity demanded is zero, which stands 
for the difference between what consumers actually pay and what they would pay if all units 
were sold at marginal price, i.e., the instrumental difference variable (IVD). 
 Graphically, 
Figure 2 – Customer’s water bill and marginal price for a specific rate structure and its linear estimate 
Adapted from Billings (1982:388) 













Linear BILL   7
 
  Despite the differences among the studies, there are similarities in terms of the 
findings. One common output is the sign and magnitude of the effect of water price on water 
demand. Usually, there is an agreement that price has a negative effect on a household’s water 
consumption but that the price elasticity of demand is weak. Among the justifications for 
these results there is the small proportion of the budget related to water expenditure and the 
lack of close substitutes for water, together with the fact that water is vital, especially for 
inside uses. When it was possible to estimate “winter or in-house demand” and “sprinkling or 
summer demand” separately, authors such as Howe and Linaweaver (1967), Danielson 
(1979), Hansen (1996), Agthe and Billings (1996), Renwick and Archibald (1998), showed a 
different influence of price, which was its comprehensively greater effect on “sprinkling or 
summer demand”. 
Moreover, positive effects of variables such as income and size of the household on 
water consumption are widely accepted. 
Finally, among the explanatory variables, climatic ones are frequently tested in the 
empirical literature on water demand. 
 
 
3. Water supply, water use and pricing in some municipalities in the Centre 
Region of Portugal 
 
Before trying to estimate and test any model of water demand in Portugal it is 
important to be aware of some characteristics of the Portuguese water market. 
The area of the study comprises five municipalities in the Centre Region of Portugal. 
In 2003 the water utilities operating in this area provided water supply to 98% of the 
population in their local communities. In addition to the residential and services segment, 
water utilities serve industrial, commercial and other demands. However, data from INE 
(2002) indicates that residential and services consumption represents almost 73% of the total 
amount supplied by the public network in the area studied in 2003, which is very similar to 
the figure of 74% in the whole of Portugal. Data from the water operators reveal that 
households consume almost 70% of the total water supplied in the municipalities studied. 
Data from official population estimates - INE (2003) and operators, show an increase 
of domestic water consumption, from 112 litres in 2001 to 137 litres per person per day in 
2003, or from 281 in 2001 to 325 litres per domestic meter in 2003.   8
With respect to network losses, computed as the weight of the difference between the 
volume of water produced and distributed on the volume of water produced (APDA, 2004), 
assume a problematic value around 30% in the local communities studied. 
The market structure for the Portuguese water sector can be characterized as local 
(municipal) natural monopolies, with heterogeneity of institutional arrangements in water 
supply and wastewater. Portuguese local communities have been responsible for water supply, 
treatment and sanitation since the 70s. Although responsible for the satisfactory operation of 
local water services, in practice municipalities can decide to operate water utilities by 
themselves or to delegate it to a company, by a concession process. In this last case, the 
private sector can participate in the Portuguese water industry. Thus, water supply and 
sanitation can be provided in Portugal directly by local public water authorities, (under 
municipal services, municipalized services
2 or municipal public firms-MPF) or by companies, 
which interact as concessionaries of the systems. 
In the municipalities studied, there are no management forms other than municipal or 
municipalized services, except for one municipality where the transformation of such a type 
of service into a MPF occurred during the observation period. 
Contrary to the great majority of European countries, since 1997 there has been a 
centralized public authority in charge of regulating the water supply and wastewater services 
in Portugal. But its jurisdiction in the field of setting prices is limited to issuing non-binding 
opinions about price regimes, and only when it comes to services delegated to private 
operators. But, even in these cases, the price system is one criterion for the selection of the 
contestants, so it is regulated by the concession contract. Therefore, the regulator’s powers are 
restricted to making recommendations on the proposed prices, and only if the service is 
provided by a concessionaire, which reveals a weak power of intervention. 
In the other cases, prevailing throughout the studied area, each community makes its 
own decision on the price setting (level and structure) process, and that decision is only 
subject to approval by the municipal assembly. However, the overwhelming opinion in 
Portugal is that prices are underestimated and do not covers even the operating costs. In 
relation to this, there is a consensus among specialists about the need to change the way tariffs 
are set in order to meet the Water Framework Directive stipulations, i.e., to take into account 
of the principle of recovery of the costs of water services, including environmental and 
resource costs, in accordance with the polluter pays principle. 
                                                 
2 These services, unlike municipal ones, have financial and managing autonomy although without a legal 
standard.   9
Generally, a water bill has three components: one is related to the supply process, 
another to the sanitation services and a third component corresponds to taxes. Most 
communities use a water price divided into one variable part and one fixed part. Regardless of 
the type of management, water is usually sold to Portuguese residential users under increasing 
block rates. Thus, Portuguese households face a multi-part tariff, which consists of several 
elements: a fixed charge, also known as availability of service charge, for being connected to 
the water supply system (which must be paid even if no water is consumed) and to the 
sewerage system, and one or more elements resulting from one or more prices per cubic meter 
(usually known as a volumetric rates) times the total amount consumed or parts of the total 
volume consumed. 
Often, there are several blocks in each municipality, with each block being defined by 
lower and upper (except for the top block) volumes of consumption. The usual number of 
blocks applied in each municipality in Portugal varies between 3 and 6, inclusive. Three 
municipalities used in our study have three blocks, one has four and, and one has six blocks. 
In all cases we found availability of service charges and increasing block rates, which mean 
that volumetric rates rise as more water is consumed. 
Therefore, excluding taxes, the rule for determining a water bill (water supply plus 
sewerage) for a quantity, q3, of water consumed in a municipality where 3 blocks are defined 
is: 
( ) ( ) ww ws ws ws p q p q q p q q p q SC CC Bill × + × − + × − + × + + = 3 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 ) (  (3.a) 
where 
CC - fixed connection charge; 
SC - fixed sewerage charge; 
qi   - upper volume of consumption in the i block; 
pwsi - price of the consumption in the i
th block; 
pww - price related to wastewater services. 
However, as a consequence of the lack of effective price regulation, each municipality 
has its own price scheme. In some situations, there was an adjustment on the dimension and 
number of blocks, throughout the period of the analysis. There are other differences besides 
the differences in the number and dimension of blocks. In relation to the payment of water 
supply services, among the operators having three blocks, in the first years of the analysis two   10
local communities applied only one price to the total amount of water consumed, according to 
the block where that volume belongs, and another local water authority, did the same during 
the entire period. In such cases equation (3.a) becomes: 
ww ws p q p q SC CC Bill × + × + + = 3 3 3 ) (  (3.b) 
Concerning the sanitation process, in our group of five municipalities, one was found 
to have no payment for these types of services (no SC and no qi ×pww). Another exception is 
one case where the SC is defined according to the amount of water consumed and in this case 
qi ×pww does not exist. Finally, another difference occurs in one case where pww applies to 
eighty percent of the volume of water consumed. 
In order to have some idea of differences between municipalities in terms of prices, 
marginal prices based on a monthly residential consumption of 10 m
3 of water were 
computed. Their values are presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Marginal price of the 10
th cubic meter of water consumed 
  Municipality 1  Municipality 2  Municipality 3  Municipality 4  Municipality 5 
1998  0.486 0.462 0.632 0.545  0.365 
1999  0.485 0.461 0.617 0.561  0.356 
2000  0.582 0.457 0.601 0.564  0.370 
2001  0.576 0.447 0.576 0.557  0.354 
2002  0.402 0.453 0.616 0.555  0.385 
2003  0.389 0.465 0.613 0.552  0.455 
       
All prices are expressed in constant escudos (PTE) from 1997, translated to euro equivalents (1€ = 200.482 PTE). 
 
Besides marginal prices borne for the same quantity differing between municipalities, 
it is also interesting to point up the decrease in real marginal prices that occurs in some cases, 
during the period. 
 
 
4. Dataset description and methodology 
 
We used a panel data sample of 5 municipalities and 72 months, from January 1998 to 
December 2003, corresponding to a total number of 360 observations. 
  Information on residential water consumption and its respective prices was requested 
from the operators of water utilities. More precisely, we asked for data on tariff schemes 
(number and dimension of blocks, volumetric rates and fixed charges) for domestic water 
supply, total domestic use and number of domestic accounts per billing period. We also   11
requested data on tariffs for sewerage services, if applicable, in order to obtain the value of 
the water bill. 
  The billing periods are either one or two months. Therefore, data on domestic 
consumption was standardized into monthly equivalents, by assuming that, when bimonthly 
billing period applies, consumption during that period was constant. 
  Because data obtained on domestic consumption was aggregated at community level, 
we constructed the explained variable – monthly water consumption per typical 
(representative) household in a local community – by dividing total domestic consumption by 
the number of domestic accounts (number of residential customers). 
  Data on consumption and the tariff schedules applied in each period were combined to 
obtain the price-related explanatory variables. Since multipart tariff structures are used in all 
municipalities, we followed the Taylor (1975)–Nordin (1976) specification for the marginal 
price and difference variable. In order to prevent the simultaneity bias from using observed 
quantities to determine the values of marginal price and difference directly from the rate 
schedule, we considered the suggestion proposed by Billings (1982) to compute a constant 
marginal price and difference parameter for each rate structure (for each municipality and for 
each year). 
Our instrumental variable approach started by using (3.a) or (3.b) to compute the 
values of the theoretical water bills, associated with all integer values of monthly water use 
per account between 2m
3 and 17m
3 (which we consider the reasonable range of typical 
household consumption based on the data used and empirical literature reviewed). Then, we 
estimated the water bill functions (one to each rate schedule) regressing the theoretical water 
bill values linearly against the corresponding integer values of monthly water use per account 
(q). As mentioned before, ivp is the slope and ivd is the intercept of the estimated function
3, 
and they do not vary with observed quantities which means that we derived the constant 
instrumental marginal price (ivp) and instrumental difference (ivd) parameters. 
  However, due to the fact that water prices are reviewed only once a year, or less, the 
Billing variables, ivp and ivd, would be constant for 12 or more months, for each 
municipality. Thus, using a monthly retail price index series we did a deflation adjustment 
and computed the monthly ivp and ivd variables. 
To find out if consumers react to the penalization imposed by the fact that only one 
block price applies to every cubic meter consumed (equation 3.b), we used a dummy variable, 
                                                 
3 See, in Section 2, Billings (1982) suggestion for solving the simultaneity bias which tend to occur under block 
rate tariffs.   12
dumc, which takes the value 1 in this case and the value 0 if several block prices are applied 
(equation 3.a). 
Several sources provided the data on socio-economic and climate variables. Some 
socio-economic variables came from the 2001 Portuguese Census and, therefore there is no 
within-unit variability for these variables: they vary only cross-sectionally. In this group of 
variables we include the number of residents per household (numres) and percentage of 
people over 65 (ov65). The influence of this last variable on water consumption was 
suggested and tested by Nauges and Thomas (2000) and by Martínez-Espiñeira (2003). 
Because there was no monthly data available on typical household income, we 
followed one procedure used by INE to compute the purchasing power indexes, calculating 
automatic teller machines withdrawals per capita (inc) and deflating it to be used as a proxy 
for the income variable. 
Finally, information on climate variables (from the closest station to each 
municipality) was collected from AGRIBASE and includes information on precipitation and 
temperature. The values used for these variables are their normal values per month, computed 
as historical (long-term) averages for a period of 30 years. They vary per month and per 
municipality. 
  The definition of the variables used and a summary of some statistics can be found in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – List of variables 
Variables Definition  (unit)  Type  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent            





8.592 1.9716 4.6361  15.58668 
Independents            
Ivp  Instrumental variable for water (plus 
sewerage) marginal price (€ 1997) 
CS-
TS 
0.688 0.1149 0.4692  0.9062 




1.335 0.7411 0.3690  2.7286 
Dumc  Dummy variable (1 if the price applies 
to all cubic metres; 0 otherwise)  
CS-
TS 
0.333 0.4721  0  1 
Inc  Proxy variable for income (€1997)    107.07  37.5754  12.8583  208.9297 
Numres  Number of residents per household  CS  2.52  0.2138  2.2  2.8 
ov65  Percentage of people over 65  CS  0.167  0.01913  0.1461  0.1954 




13.895 4.5297  3.6  20.9 
Prec  Normal monthly precipitation (mm)  CS-
TS 
82.858 45.160  6.2  148.6 
t            
CS stands for cross-section and TS for time series. 
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  According to the literature, ivp, ivd, prec, ov65 and dumc were hypothesized to be 
negatively correlated with residential water use whereas inc,  numres and temp were 
hypothesized to be negatively correlated. 
Given the contribution of studies conducted in the field of water demand, data 
availability and the transformation we have made to obtain certain variables, the following 
demand equation is postulated and estimated: 
 
it it it i i it it it it it prec temp ov numres inc dumc ivd ivp q ε β β β β β β β β β + + + + + + + + + = 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 65  (4) 
 
where i=1, 2, …, 5 is the index which identifies each municipality and t=1, 2, …, 72 denotes 
time period.  it i it υ µ ε + =  refers to the error term. The i µ  component is a community specific 
error term, and reflects spatial unexplained variation while the  it υ  component reflects all 
(spatial and temporal) residual unexplained variation. Both error terms are assumed to be 
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. 
  The result of the Hausman test favoured the specification of the random effect model 
over the specification of the fixed effect model. Thus, we considered a random effects model, 
which requires the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation method. Equation (4) is 
assumed to be linear and estimated using a GLS approach, with a correction for a 1
st-order 
autoregressive disturbance process
4, to obtain the β coefficients using panel data. 
 
 
 5.  Results 
 
  The GLS estimation results, using the software STATA 8.0, for water demand 
equation are shown in Table 3. 
 
                                                 
4 Using the “xtregar” instruction, from the software STATA 8.0.   14
Table 3 – Results of the estimated residential demand equation 
Variable Estimated  coefficient  Z Statistic 
Constant  10.22722 3.48* 
Ivp  -6.976089 -6.34* 
Ivd  0.7730964 4.18* 
Dumc  0.6718489 2.90* 
Inc  -0.00046 -0.13 
Numres  1.481168 2.60* 
Ov65  -34.85687 -5.27* 
Temp  0.1978384 6.01* 
Prec  0.0046476 1.36 
Adjusted R
2  0.6920    
* Significant at a 1% level of significance. 
 
  The adjusted R
2 indicates an acceptable model performance. 
The coefficient on the marginal price is statistically significant and presents the 
expected negative signal. Because of the hypothesis of the linear demand curve assumed, the 
price elasticity varies with price and typical household use levels. Thus, if we consider the 
average marginal price and average water use we obtain an elasticity value of -0,558, which 
falls within the ranges of those found in the literature. 
The derivative of water use with respect to difference variable is statistically 
significant but shows an unexpected positive sign. Despite the water utilities’ preference for 
increasing block rates, due to the fixed charges’ values the series for D variable always 
assumed positive values
5. This positive sign for D represents a negative income effect for the 
water customer derived from the tariff structure. An increase in D should, therefore, cause a 
reduction in water use. 
The positive sign of the D coefficient may be due to the fact that fixed quotas work 
against water conservation purpose, distorting the pro-conservation incentive pursued by the 
increasing tariffs. Thus, it becomes clear the residential consumer’s difficulties in interpreting 
the price schedule become clear and it is not surprising that they do not react as we 
anticipated. 
In accordance with the above explanation, Dumc does not show the expected negative 
sign, which means that consumers do not react to price schemes that penalize high water 
consumption levels more (by charging the same high price for every cubic meter consumed) 
by cutting consumption (saving water). 
The estimation results also indicate that, except for precipitation and income, all the 
other coefficients have significant effects on residential water consumption. The estimated 
                                                 
5 See Table 2 in the previous section.   15
coefficient of the variable used here as a proxy for income is not statistically significant. This 
result can be explained since water accounts for a small proportion of disposable family 
income, due to the low levels of water prices. 
The size of the household and the percentage of old people estimated coefficients 
exhibit the expected signs. The positive coefficient of numres means that where the household 
is large, consumption will also be high. The negative sign of the ov65 means that a higher 
proportion of elderly people can result in lower average use of water. 
The air temperature variable is positively correlated with residential water demand and 
its coefficient is statistically significant, suggesting that high temperatures increase the 
demand for water. The fact that the rainfall variable does not reveal statistical significance is 
not surprising since the prec variable presents a positive sign, which was not expected. 
 
 
  6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
There is some consensus among water utility managers, policymakers, and economists 
on the relevance of water price as an instrument to be used by DSM policies. Accordingly, 
literature on residential water demand shows that in spite of weak price elasticities, there is a 
negative influence of water price on water consumption. Furthermore, it is also accepted that 
non-price policies, such as the promotion of low-consumption equipment, awareness 
campaigns and educational programs, should also be considered as means of controlling 
demand. 
  The results obtained in the present study agree in some aspects with other case studies 
on residential water demand. In the studied area, the marginal price varies with the amount of 
water used (the practice of increasing block rates is the rule) and domestic water demand 
appears to be negatively influenced by marginal prices. Water pricing therefore seems to be 
useful to help in the rationalization of water use. Nevertheless, the result achieved for 
marginal price elasticity of residential water demand should be viewed with caution. Negative 
price elasticity can also be a consequence of a general tendency for water demand to increase, 
along with a fall in water prices in real terms (in several cases they rose less than inflation 
rates). 
  Moreover, the way water prices are determined means that they send confusing signals 
to consumers. The water tariff data that we collected revealed complex structures that 
combine several components, and they therefore distort the ability of domestic consumers to   16
relate the size of the bill to the volume of water purchased. The main source of confusion 
comes simultaneously from the generalized use of availability of service charges and 
increasing block rates, because of their contradictory role. The employment of increasing 
block tariffs is justified because it is appropriate to the goal of conserving water resource, 
since if more water is consumed, then successively higher prices are faced (penalization of 
high consumption). On the other hand, the presence of fixed charges (to be connected to the 
supply and sewerage systems) implies that increasing water use allows these fixed amounts to 
be distributed in a large number of cubic meters. This complexity/contradiction may well 
explain the unexpected coefficient sign obtained for the difference variable. 
Finally, it is important to take into account that increasing water prices to control 
demand should not ignore the imperative of the universal service obligation, at least in 
relation to the minimum quantities considered vital for human life. On top of all this, attention 
must be paid to the fact that increasing block tariffs penalizes households with numerous 
members, as a result of the positive influence of the size of the household (numres variable) 
on residential water demand. 
  Summarizing, it seems clear that the effects of water prices on demand can be 
improved by making consumers more aware of how their consumption affects their water bill. 
To this end, it is imperative to clarify the signals sent by the individual components of the 
tariff. One interesting way to promote adequate pricing policies in the Portuguese water sector 
could be to give the existing regulatory authority powers to intervene in the price setting 
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